On 10 June 2025, Schedule 2 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) commenced operation, introducing a new statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. For the first time in Australia, individuals have a direct right to seek damages for a serious interference with their privacy, rather than being forced to rely on indirect and imperfect legal pathways.
The reform represents a significant shift in Australian law. It also carries important implications for solicitors, professional advisers and any organisation that collects, stores or uses personal information.
The Background to Reform
Until recently, the Australian legal system did not recognise a standalone tort of invasion of privacy. Although the High Court in ABC v Lenah Game Meats left open the possibility that such a cause of action may emerge at common law, it was never definitively adopted. As a result, plaintiffs seeking remedy for serious privacy intrusions were required to rely on other causes of action, such as defamation, breach of confidence, trespass or nuisance. Those causes of action were often ill-suited to the task.
In some cases, courts were required to stretch defamation principles in order to vindicate what was, in substance, a privacy right. The absence of a coherent privacy action became increasingly problematic in the digital era, particularly in the context of intimate image sharing, cyber-attacks and large-scale data breaches.
Following a series of law reform inquiries, culminating in the 2023 Privacy Act Review Report, Parliament concluded that there were clear gaps in the existing legal framework. The result is a statutory tort designed to protect personal dignity, autonomy and private life in contemporary Australia.
The Elements of the Tort
To establish a claim, a plaintiff must prove several cumulative elements. The new statutory tort is created by section 15A of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act). Section 15A(1) provides that an individual has a cause of action against another person if:
- the person invades the individual’s privacy by:
- intruding upon the individual’s seclusion; or
- misusing information relating to the individual;
- a person in the position of the individual would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances;
- the invasion of privacy was intentional or reckless;
- the invasion of privacy was serious; and
- the public interest in the plaintiff’s privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest.
Each element must be established.
Invasion of privacy
First, there must be an invasion of privacy. The legislation recognises two principal forms of invasion. Section 15B of the Act defines the forms of invasion. “Intrusion upon seclusion” includes physically or otherwise intruding into a person’s private space or activities, such as watching, listening to or recording them in circumstances where they are entitled to privacy.
“Misuse of information” is defined broadly and includes collecting, storing, using or disclosing information about an individual. Importantly, the tort is not confined to publication. Liability may arise from the handling of personal information in circumstances amounting to serious misuse.
This scope is particularly significant in the context of cyber incidents and data breaches.
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Section 15C of the Act requires the court to consider whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The section lists non-exhaustive factors that the court must take into account, including:
- the nature of the information;
- the place where the intrusion occurred;
- the means used to obtain the information;
- the purpose of the misuse or intrusion;
- whether the information was already in the public domain;
- the attributes of the plaintiff; and
- the conduct of the plaintiff.
No single factor is determinative. The enquiry is objective and contextual.
Fault: Intention or Recklessness
Thirdly, section 15D of the Act makes clear that the invasion must be intentional or reckless. Negligence alone is insufficient.
Recklessness is defined in the Act as awareness of a substantial risk that privacy would be invaded and, having regard to the circumstances known to the defendant, it was unjustifiable to take that risk. This definition may have particular consequences for organisations that fail to implement adequate cybersecurity measures or that disregard known vulnerabilities in their data systems.
Seriousness Threshold
Fourthly, the invasion must be serious pursuant to section 15E of the Act. In assessing seriousness, the court may consider matters such as:
- the degree of offence, distress or harm likely to be caused;
- whether the invasion was malicious;
- the extent of the intrusion; and
- the sensitivity of the information.
The seriousness threshold is designed to exclude trivial or technical claims. In determining whether an invasion meets this threshold, the court may consider the likely degree of distress or harm, whether the conduct was malicious, the sensitivity of the information and the extent of the intrusion. Importantly, however, the tort is actionable without proof of actual damage. A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate financial loss or a recognised psychiatric illness. The cause of action is directed at protecting dignity and personal autonomy.
Public Interest Balancing
Finally, the court must be satisfied that the public interest in protecting the plaintiff’s privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest in the invasion. Section 15F of the Act introduces an express public interest balancing requirement. The court must be satisfied that the public interest in protecting the plaintiff’s privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest in the invasion.
The Act expressly recognises that relevant public interests may include freedom of political communication, freedom of expression (including artistic expression), public health and safety, and national security. This balancing exercise will be central to the development of the jurisprudence under the new Part, and the statutory language makes clear that the public interest dimension is integral to the analysis and will often require careful judicial evaluation.
Remedies
Section 15G of the Act vests the court with broad remedial powers, enabling it to grant relief tailored to the circumstances of the case. Available remedies include injunctions (both interim and permanent) restraining publication or further misuse of information, as well as damages, including damages for emotional distress. The court may also award exemplary damages (subject to the statutory cap), order an account of profits, require an apology or correction, direct the delivery up or destruction of material, and grant declaratory relief. In addition, the legislation confers a residual discretion allowing the court to fashion any other remedy it considers appropriate.
General damages are capped in line with the maximum applicable to non-economic loss in defamation proceedings, with exemplary damages included within that overall limit. Notably, damages for emotional distress may be awarded without proof of a recognised psychiatric injury, reflecting a significant departure from traditional personal injury principles and underscoring the dignity-based focus of the tort.
Defences and Exemptions
Part IIIA of the Act provides a number of statutory defences. An invasion will not attract liability where it was required or authorised by or under an Australian law, or by a court or tribunal. A defence also arises where the plaintiff consented, whether expressly or impliedly, or where the defendant reasonably believed the conduct was necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to life, health or safety.
The Act further incorporates protections analogous to established defamation defences, including absolute privilege and fair reporting of proceedings of public concern.
Of particular significance is the exemption for journalistic material under section 15K. The tort does not apply to the collection, preparation or publication of journalistic material by professional journalists or their employers. “Journalistic material” is defined broadly to encompass news, current affairs, documentary content and commentary, and the exemption applies irrespective of whether professional standards have been breached. In practical terms, this substantially narrows the tort’s operation in relation to mainstream media.
Additional exemptions apply to minors, enforcement bodies, intelligence agencies, and certain government authorities acting in good faith in the performance of their functions.
Limitation Period
Section 15L of the Act provides that proceedings must generally be commenced within 12 months from the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the invasion. In any event, claims are subject to a long-stop limitation period of three years from the date of the invasion. Where the plaintiff was under 18 at the time, proceedings may be commenced up until their 21st birthday.
Implications for Legal Practitioners and Organisations
For solicitors and organisations handling personal information, the statutory tort introduces both advisory and operational risk.
Law firms routinely collect and store highly sensitive client information. In the event of a cyber-attack or data breach, it may be alleged that inadequate safeguards amounted to reckless conduct. Given the widespread awareness of phishing risks and cybersecurity obligations, courts may scrutinise internal systems, training programs and data retention practices closely.
There is also potential exposure in circumstances involving the misuse of client information during the conduct of litigation. The longstanding obligation not to deploy discovered material for collateral purposes may now carry an additional layer of risk under the statutory privacy regime.
Beyond direct liability, practitioners must ensure that they are equipped to advise clients about the existence and operation of the new cause of action. Failure to identify a viable claim within the limitation period may itself carry professional consequences.
Prudent risk management requires a proactive approach. Firms and organisations should ensure that personal information is collected only where necessary, stored securely, and retained only for as long as required. Privacy policies should be reviewed and updated. Staff training should address both cybersecurity awareness and the proper handling of confidential information. Data breach response plans should be in place and tested. Engagement letters should clearly explain how client information will be used and obtain appropriate consents.
It is also relevant that the legislation provides that an apology does not constitute an admission of liability. Courts are likely to look favourably upon early, responsible responses to privacy incidents.
Conclusion
The statutory tort of serious invasion of privacy marks a substantial development in Australian law. It provides a coherent and direct avenue of redress for serious intrusions into private life, particularly in an era defined by digital communication and large-scale data storage.
At the same time, it introduces complex questions concerning recklessness, seriousness and public interest. As judicial interpretation develops, the contours of the tort will become clearer. In the interim, organisations and legal practitioners should treat privacy compliance not merely as a regulatory obligation, but as a potential source of civil liability requiring careful governance and ongoing vigilance.
If you think this information may be relevant to you, or if you are concerned about a serious invasion of privacy, please contact our office on (02) 9307 8900, or email m.finch@hfklawyers.com.au to speak with a member of our team.